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Abstract 
In this paper, I examine how student academic achievements and behavior were affected by a school finance policy 
experiment undertaken in elementary schools in Israel. Begun in 2004, the funding formula changed from a budget 
set per class to a budget set per student, with more weight given to students from lower socioeconomic and lower 
educational backgrounds. The experiment altered teaching budgets, the length of the school week, and the 
allocation of time devoted to core subjects. The results suggest that spending more money and spending more time 
at school and on key tasks all lead to increasing academic achievements with no behavioral costs. I find that the 
overall budget per class has positive and significant effects on students' average test scores and that this effect is 
symmetric and identical for schools that gained or lost resources due to the funding reform. Separate estimations of 
the effect of increasing the length of the school week and the subject-specific instructional time per week also show 
positive and significant effects on math, science, and English test scores. However, no cross effects of additional 
instructional time across subjects emerge, suggesting that the effect of overall weekly school instruction time on 
test scores reflects only the effect of additional instructional time in these particular subjects. As a robustness check 
of the validity of the identification strategy, I also use an alternative method that exploits variation in the instruction 
time of different subjects. Remarkably, this alternative identification strategy yields almost identical results to the 
results obtained based on the school funding reform. Additional results suggest that the effect on test scores is 
similar for boys and girls but it is much larger for pupils from low socioeconomic backgrounds and it is also more 
pronounced in schools populated with students from homogenous socioeconomic backgrounds. The evidence also 
shows that a longer school week increases the time that students spend on homework without reducing social and 
school satisfaction and without increasing school violence.     
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I. Introduction  
Questions about how students' academic achievements are affected by school resources, such as 
the amount of time they spend in school and the amount of time they devote to specific subjects, are of 
compelling interest for policymakers. Research on these questions are important since marginally 
increasing instructional time is relatively simple to do, and the potential to make such changes would 
seem to be possible in many countries as international statistics on the annual number of school days and 
on the distribution of weekly instructional time across subjects reveal large differences among and within 
countries.
1
 For example, one of the main educational strategies of the “No Excuses” charter schools in 
New York, Boston and other places in the US is to emphasize the importance of increased instructional 
time (Dobbie and Fryer 2011).
2
 In addition, evidence on these questions is valuable for improving the 
efficiency of school resource allocation, in particular the instruction budgets of schools across various 
subjects and activities.   
While an extensive literature exists regarding the effects of school resources on student 
outcomes, much of the evidence is inconclusive.
 3
 For example, regarding the impact of school resources, 
Hanushek (2006) notes in an extensive survey that “the evidence – whether from aggregate school 
                                                 
1
 The OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2003, 2006, and 2009 data reveal the great 
extent of these differences among the more than 60 countries that participated in this project. The reaction to these 
differences suggests that political leaders do pay attention to the results. For example, President Barack Obama 
cited the gap between the length of the school year in the United States and other countries as one reason he 
advocates the expansion of  U.S. schools’ instruction time among his key educational policy goals (March 10, 
2009, at a speech to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce).  
2
 The so-called “No Excuses” schools are loosely defined as schools that emphasize strict discipline, extended time 
in school, and an intensive focus on building basic reading and math skills. In fact, Thernstrom and Thernstrom 
(2004) and Whitman (2008) argue that the “No Excuses” schools are more effective due to more instructional time, 
a zero tolerance disciplinary code, high academic expectations for all students, and an emphasis on teaching basic 
math and reading skills. However, these impressions are based on correlative analysis which does not permit causal 
interpretation. 
3
 For instance, using TIMSS data and citing few recent studies, Wößmann (2003) reports that international 
differences in pupil test scores (in mathematics and science) are not caused by differences in school resources. In a 
French program that allocates extra financial resources to schools in disadvantaged zones, Benabou et al. (2004) 
find that this allocation has no significant impact on student outcomes. Häkkinen et al. (2003) uses the dramatic 
changes in the school spending caused by the 1990s recession in Finland and finds that changes in teaching 
expenditure did not have a significant effect on the test scores. Hanusheck (2003) report that inputs based schooling  
policies in the US failed to improve students' test scores. Lavy (2002) finds that providing resources to high schools 
led to significant gains in test scores and lower dropout rates. Focusing on labor market outcomes, Card and 
Krueger (1996) find positive effects of school resources on earnings, whereas Heckman et al. (1996) do not find 
significant effects, and Betts (2001) finds mixed results. 
2 
 
outcomes, econometric investigations, or a variety of experimental or quasi-experimental approaches – 
suggests that pure resource policies that do not change incentives are unlikely to be effective. 
Importantly, the results appear similar across both developed and developing countries.” In addition, 
specific evidence on time use in schools is limited largely to the effect of the number of school days per 
year on student's achievements.
4
 Thus, this evidence does not tell us much about the effect of the number 
of hours children spend in school every week; or the time they spend in specific activities, such as math 
or reading; or whether there is a complementarity or a spillover effect across subjects.  
In this paper, I investigate the causal effect of school resources – the total teaching budget per 
class, the number of hours that children spend weekly in school and the amount of time devoted to core 
subjects – on pupils' achievements. I exploit a unique school finance policy experiment that changed the 
formula used to determine the teaching budget of primary schools in Israel. Until 2003, schools were 
funded based on the number of classes, irrespective of class size. In September 2004, the funding rules 
were changed and from then on schools received funding per student enrolled where a deprivation index 
was used to determine the amount of each “student voucher,” with more money channeled toward 
students from the lowest economic and educational backgrounds.
5
 This experimental reform generated a 
sharp and exogenous change in the teaching budget of many schools. Some schools gained resources 
while other schools experienced no change or even a decline in resources. Naturally, schools with a high 
proportion of students from a deprived background or with large classes were the main beneficiaries 
from this reform.  
                                                 
4
 For example, Grogger (1996), and Eide and Showalter (1998) estimated the effect of the length of the school year 
in the United States and found insignificant effects, perhaps due to selection and omitted variables. Card and 
Krueger (1992) and Betts and Johnson (1998) used state-level data in the United States to examine the same effect 
and found positive and significant effects on earnings which converge to zero once school quality is added as a 
control in the regression. Pischke (2007) used a natural experiment in West Germany and found that a shorter 
school year increased grade repetition and lowered enrollment in higher school tracks, but it had no effect on 
earnings and employment later in life. Based on school day cancelations due to snow, Hansen (2008) reports that 
more instructional time increases student performance, and Marcotte and Hemelt (2008) find that years with 
substantial snowfall are associated with lower pupil performance. 
5
 In 2009, the funding rules were changed again to a system very similar to that used prior to September 2004. 
3 
 
For estimation, I use data from 2002-2005 for fifth-grade pupils for all the schools in the 
country. I observe each school twice, either in 2002 and 2004 or in 2003 and in 2005. The key feature of 
these data is that they present an opportunity to observe each school under the two different funding 
systems. This allows one to estimate the resulting changes in the instructional time budget per class, the 
length of the school week, and weekly instructional time by subject.  
I employ two main identification strategies in the paper. The first identification strategy 
compares schools in the years before and after the reform. The advantage of this strategy is that it 
guarantees that no other fundamental changes occurred in schools during this period. As a robustness 
check, I also use a difference in differences estimation based on restricting my sample to schools that 
either gained or experienced no change in resources due to the reform, and secondly a restricted sample 
of schools that either lost or experienced no change in resources due the reform. As an additional 
identification strategy, I use an alternative method that exploits variation in the instruction time of 
different subjects. The consistency of results obtained from these different identification strategies 
strengthens the causal interpretation of the estimates reported in this paper.   
In this paper, I consider the impact of several key explanatory variables – total teaching budget 
per class, the length of the school week, and the effect of instructional time – on the average scores in 
math, science and English. I compare the various estimates, show that they are consistent, and discuss the 
implications for the quality of identification of each of these estimates. I also evaluate the effect of 
instructional time on students’ homework time allocation, on their overall satisfaction with school, their 
social satisfaction in class, on their involvement in violent behavior, and on their fear of school bullying. 
These topics offer an indication whether social factors and student behavior are affected by the length of 
time that students spend in school during the day and week. 
  My results show that additional instructional budget per class, a longer school week, and 
additional instructional time spent on the different subjects have positive and significant effects on 
students' academic achievements. These estimates are in contrast to the “naïve” OLS estimates which are 
actually negative, reflecting a negative selection pattern of allocating higher instructional budgets to 
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potentially low achieving schools (low SES). This is the first paper to show that the biased estimated 
effect of school resources and instructional time are reversed from negative to positive once potential 
selection and endogeneity of school resources are fully accounted for.
6
 The first differences and 
difference in differences estimates of the effect of the instruction budget per class, the length of the 
school week, and of instructional time in each subject are mutually consistent and yield very similar 
elasticities of test scores with respect to any of the three measures of instruction time at school. The 
estimates show that the boost in test scores is modest. For example, increasing instructional time in math, 
science, and English by one hour per week increases the average test scores in these subjects by a 0.053 
standard deviation. The respective difference in differences estimate of this effect are 0.073 and 0.059, 
revealing symmetry in the effect of changing instruction time of the core subject. Estimating the effect 
separately for each subject yields an effect size of 0.041 in math, 0.043 in science and 0.056 in English. 
The average result of these three estimates is 0.047, only marginally lower than the estimated average 
result. Allowing for treatment heterogeneity, the growth in test scores is similar for boys and girls and is 
larger for pupils from low socioeconomic status. Overall, the main results presented in the paper are very 
robust to a variety of robustness checks with respect to their identification assumptions and to threats to 
their validity. Further, the alternative identification strategy based on pupil fixed effect and on variation 
in time of instruction across subjects yields surprisingly identical results: the estimated test score growth 
from increasing average weekly time of instruction in math, science and English by one hour per week is 
0.058, almost identical to the respective estimate of 0.053 obtained from the natural experiment based on 
the funding policy reform. It is remarkable that the two identification methods which are based on 
different assumptions yield such strikingly similar results. These estimates are also identical to estimates 
that I obtained using PISA data of all OECD countries and another sample of all East European countries 
where the identification strategy was based on pupil fixed effect and variation in time of instruction 
across subjects (Lavy 2012). The estimate of the effect of hours of instruction on math, science and 
                                                 
6
 Angrist and Lavy (1999) show a similar reversal in sign with respect to the effect of class size. The “naïve” OLS 
estimates of class size were actually positive, reflecting a negative selection pattern of allocating smaller class size 
to potentially low achieving schools (low SES). 
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English in the OECD sample, is 0.058, and in the east European sample it is 0.059. Remarkably, these 
two estimates are identical to the respective estimate based on the data from Israel.  
The funding reform was also used to study how additional time spent on instruction affects 
several behavioral outcomes of students. The results suggest that increasing instruction time in different 
subjects also increases modestly the time students spend doing homework. Furthermore, even with the 
additional time spent at school, students’ overall satisfaction from school and from its social environment 
was unaffected. In particular, increasing the length of the school week did not have any effect on these 
behavioral outcomes; resulting in no change in students’ satisfaction from school and its social 
environment, on their violent behavior, or on their fear of bullying. This is the first paper to show 
evidence of school resources and instruction time on behavioral outcomes of students. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents background on the reform. 
Section III presents our data and section IV presents our empirical strategy. Section V presents the 
evidence about the effects of school budgets on test scores and behavioral outcomes. Section VI presents 
the conclusions. 
 
II. The 2004 Funding Reform  
 The budget for primary schools in Israel comes from two sources: the Ministry of Education and 
the local municipal authority. The Ministry of Education funding is provided according to the number of 
instruction hours, which is measured in units of one hour of instruction per week for the whole school 
year. This budget funds all teaching instruction costs, as well as the cost of internal (within school) and 
external (outside of school) teachers’ training. The local authority funds all the administrative costs of 
the school such as the costs of secretaries, school supplies, and building maintenance. In the 2004 school 
year, the Ministry of Education introduced a school finance reform as a policy experiment that changed 
the formula used to determine the instruction time budget of primary schools in Israel. Until 2003, 
schools were funded based on the number of classes, irrespective of class size. Schools also received an 
additional instruction budget based on a per school deprivation index which was a weighted function of 
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the students' average parental education, family size, family income and number of immigrant students. 
Schools with a higher deprivation index received more resources. The overall instructional budget of this 
differential component amounted to about 10 percent of the overall funding of primary schools in the 
country. In September 2004, the funding rules were changed and from then on schools received funding 
per student enrolled. A deprivation index was used to determine the amount of each “student voucher,” 
with more resources channeled toward students from lower economic and educational backgrounds. The 
differential deprivation index is a per-student index calculated according to a needs-based formula (a 
larger budget is allocated to needy students according to the depth of their needs), with an added 
“national priority” element (a larger budget is allocated to students living in areas that were defined as 
'national priority' areas, such as those near Israel’s borders). The elements that form this index and their 
weights are as follows: mother's years of schooling (15%), father's years of schooling (15%), number of 
siblings (10%), new immigrant status (20%) and immigrant from developing countries status (10%), 
national priority status (20%), and periphery location status (schools located far from the three largest 
cities in Israel) (10%). Most of the weights were derived from a variance decomposition regression that 
examines the correlation between students' background characteristics and students' achievement.   
This experimental reform generated a sharp and exogenous change in the teaching budget of 
many schools. Schools with a large enrollment of students with a high deprivation index and schools 
with large classes gained resources, while others schools lost resources. The reform was intended to 
produce no changes in the overall resource distribution among schools in the Jewish public school 
system. However, the reform was designed to allow for an increase of about 15 percent to 20 percent in 
the overall budget of the Arab schooling sector, as this sector includes a much higher share of students 
with high deprivation index estimates and has larger classes. The schools that gained resources had on 
average lower pre-reform budgets per class while those who lost resources had higher pre-reform 
budgets per class. This experimental reform lasted until 2008 when it was changed again to a new system 
that was more similar to the pre-2004 rules.   
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While there are several inputs that may be affected by a change in a school's budget, I find that 
the budget per class is highly correlated with the length of the school week and with instructional time of 
math, science, and English and not with other inputs such as class size or extracurricular activities. For 
instance, the regression coefficient of budget per class on length of the school week is 0.280 (se=0.017) 
and it is very similar for schools that gained resources (0.242, se=0.023) and for schools that lost 
resources (0.324, se=0.019) due to the reform. The regression coefficient of budget per class on 
instructional time of math, science and English is 0.085 (se=0.009) and it is almost identical for schools 
that gained resources (0.087, se=0.012) and for schools that lost resources (0.097, se=0.012) due to the 
reform.
 7
 These relationships seem stable and yield the same estimates when estimated separately based 
on the pre and post reform samples. At the same time, the estimated coefficient of the budget per class on 
class size is -0.011 (se=0.034) suggesting that this is not a channel that schools used for spending their 
teaching budget. This conclusion is also evident when comparing the estimated effect of the budget per 
class on weekly hours of instruction or on core subjects instructional time obtained from two sub-
samples stratified by actual class size or predicted class size (based on maximum class size of 40, see 
Angrist and Lavy, 1999). For example, the estimated coefficient of the school budget on length of the 
school week is 0.269 in the sample of above the mean predicted class size and it is 0.276 in the sample of 
schools with below the mean predicted class size. 
 
III. Data 
 The data I use in this study are based on the Growth and Effectiveness Measures for Schools 
(GEMS - Meizav in Hebrew) datasets for the years 2002-2005. The GEMS includes a series of tests and 
questionnaires administered by the Division of Evaluation and Measurement of the Ministry of 
Education.
8
 The GEMS is administered towards the end (from mid-May to mid-June) of each school year 
                                                 
7
 These results are not presented in the paper and are available from the author. 
8
 The GEMS is not administered for school accountability purposes and only aggregated results at the district level 
are published. For more information on the GEMS see the Division of Evaluation and Measurement website (in 
Hebrew): http://cms.education.gov.il/educationcms/units/rama/odotrama/odot.htm.  
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to a representative 1-in-2 sample of all elementary and middle schools in Israel, so that each school 
participates in GEMS once every two years. The GEMS data include test scores of fifth- (primary 
school) and eighth- (middle school) grade students in math, science, Hebrew, and English. In principle, 
all students except those in special education classes are tested and the proportion of students tested is 
above 90 percent. The raw test scores used a 1-to-100 scale that I transform into z-scores to facilitate 
interpretation of the results. In this study I use only primary school data since the funding reform only 
affected primary level schools.  
 The test scores for the years 2002-2005 are linked to student administrative records collected by 
the Israel Ministry of Education. The administrative records include student demographics that I use to 
construct all measures of students’ background characteristics. Using the linked datasets, I build a panel 
for elementary schools with test scores for the years 2002-2005. The sample is restricted to Jewish public 
schools (excluding Arab and religious Orthodox Jewish schools). There are 939 elementary schools with 
test score data. Since every school is sampled once in two years, I have two observations of the same 
school for more than 90 percent of the schools.  
 The GEMS also includes interviews with all teachers and the school principal. The questionnaire 
for home teachers of all classes included questions about classroom instructional time in each subject and 
the total instructional time per week. I use teachers’ responses to these items to compute the school 
average for fifth-grade instructional time in each subject. Though there was very little difference between 
or among fifth-grade classes in a school in these time inputs, I still prefer to use the school-level mean 
per grade to avoid any biases that might be caused by sorting of students into certain classrooms and 
setting time allocations for given academic subjects according to those students’ particular strengths and 
weaknesses. In any case, the grade- and class-level measures of these time inputs are very highly 
correlated. 
I also use items from the GEMS student questionnaire that address various aspects of the school 
and their learning environment. I concentrate on two sections of the questionnaire: the first provides 
information on student satisfaction in school and on the violent behaviour of other students and the 
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second provides data on student allocation of time for homework by subject. In the first section students 
are asked to rate the extent to which they agree with a series of statements on a six-point scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. These items include: (1) “There are many fights among 
students in my classroom”; (2) “Sometimes I’m scared to go to school because there are violent 
students”; (3) “I am often involved in violent activities in school”; (4) “I feel well-adjusted socially in 
my class”; and (5) “I am satisfied in school”. I transformed students’ responses to these items into 
standardized z-scores. In the second section of the questionnaire, students are asked to report the number 
of hours per week that they spend at home doing homework in each of three subjects (math, science and 
English).  
 In Table 1, I present summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Column 1 lists the 
results for our key variables in the pre-reform period of 2002-2003 and column 2 lists the results for the 
post-reform period of 2004-2005. Panel A presents the results for the budget per class and instructional 
time variable, all measured in terms of weekly hours of instruction. According to the table, the mean 
budget per class is the same in both periods, suggesting that the reform had no impact on the distribution 
of resources among the Jewish secular schools. The length of the school week is on average 35 hours, 
implying that 76 percent of the teaching budget of schools is used for classroom instruction. The rest of 
the teaching budget is used to fund teachers’ training, to pay personnel for extracurricular activities in 
school, and after school remedial education programs. The average instructional time of the three core 
subjects of math, science and English is 14 hours a week, over two-fifths of it used for math instruction 
and the rest divided almost equally between the other two subjects. Overall, there seems to be little 
difference in instructional time in the years before and after the reform. Panel B presents the means for 
the average test scores and also for each subject. Panel C presents the means for school characteristics, 
which are almost identical over the two periods respectively.   
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IV. Empirical Strategy 
The effects of unobserved correlated factors usually confound the effect of school budget or 
instructional time on student outcomes. Such correlations could result if self-selection and sorting of 
students across schools are affected by school resources, or if there is a correlation between school 
instructional time and other characteristics of the school that may affect student outcomes. The structure 
of the GEMS allows me to use an identification strategy that overcomes this potential problem because it 
is based on observing schools and their students at two points of time: before the funding reform (in 2002 
or 2003) and after the funding reform (in 2004 or 2005). I take advantage of this feature and construct a 
longitudinal dataset at the school level to examine how changes in students’ achievements are associated 
with changes in instructional time. Note that the change in instructional budget can only be due to the 
funding reform because there is no school choice at the primary schooling level in any school districts in 
Israel and assignment to schools is based on pre-determined rules (mainly the family location of 
residence). As a result, the potential for selection bias due to sorting of students across schools based on 
instruction budget or time is very small in this context.   
To develop the relationships of interest using the panel data, I first specify the following standard 
education production function that links pupils’ achievements and their relevant determinants:   
             Yij0 αjγ Wj0Xij0 Sj0 uij0                 (1) 
where Yij0 is the average achievement of the i
th
 student in math, science and English, in the j
th
 school in 
period zero (pre-reform), Wj0 is the total budget of instructional time per class in the j
th
 school in pre-
reform period. Xij0 is a vector of characteristics of the i
th
 student, Sj0 is a vector of time varying 
characteristics of the j
th
 school, αjis a school fixed effect that captures everything about the school that 
is not observed and does not vary between the two years that each school is observed (2002 and 2004 or 
2003 and 2005) and uij0 is the unobserved error term. Observing schools in more than one time period 
allows expanding equation (1) to the post reform period in the following equation: 
Yij1 αjγ Wj1Xij1 S j1 uij1                                                                                            (2) 
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where 1 denotes the post reform period. Differencing equations (1) and (2) yields a first difference 
equation that is equivalent to the following school fixed effect model that we can estimate with a panel 
data on schools: 
             Yijt αjγ WjtXijt S jt uijt                                                                     (3) 
where t denotes the time period. In this model, the identifying assumption is that Wjt could have changed 
between the two periods for each school only because of the change in the funding rules and that the 
average value of the X’s (which are used to compute the deprivation index) remained unchanged. 
Therefore, conditional on a school fixed effect, the change in Wjtis not correlated with the change in uijt. 
 Equation (3) can also be used for difference in differences estimation once we take advantage of 
the unique feature of the funding reform that benefited some schools who gained resources while it 
harmed other schools that lost resources. Exploiting this feature of the reform, I run two sets of 
difference in differences estimations, which are variations of equation (3). In the first estimation, I 
restrict the sample to include only schools that either gained resources (treatment group) or had no 
change in resources (control group). In the second estimation, I restrict the sample to include only 
schools that either lost resources (treatment group) or had no change in resources (control group). 
Beyond providing a robustness check to the identification strategy that I use, the estimates from these 
two distinct sets of difference in differences estimation can also shed light on the very interesting and 
policy-relevant question of whether gaining or losing resources has a symmetric effect on test scores. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
A. Main Results    
Table 2 presents our baseline results on the relationship between class budgets and student 
achievements in math, science, and English. The table estimates equation (3) with varying degrees of 
control variables. The estimates presented in column 1 are from OLS regressions which include only 
subject and year fixed effects as controls. The estimates presented in column 2 are from regressions that 
12 
 
include also school fixed effects. Column 3 also controls for student characteristics and column 4 
controls for time varying school characteristics. In Panel A, I report estimates from a regression in which 
the instructional budget per class measured in weekly hours is the treatment variable. The mean of 
instructional budget per class is 46.6 (sd=5.99). The OLS estimate in column 1 is negative (-0.015) and 
significant (sd=0.002) which means that school resources and test scores are negatively correlated. This 
is most likely a biased estimate since schools with lower potential outcomes receive compensatory 
resources. The bias could also result from omitted variables that are correlated with student performance. 
However adding the school fixed effect reverses the sign of the estimate to be positive (0.007) and 
statistically significant (sd=0.003). This estimate is unchanged in the other two specifications (columns 
3-4). This suggests that conditional on the school fixed effects, the instructional budget per class is not 
correlated with student and time varying school characteristics such as enrollment. This confirms the 
identification assumption that the school characteristics used in the budget formula have not changed 
during the two years between the pre- and post-funding reform. Therefore, we can be confident that the 
change in the school instructional budget reflects only the change in the weights of these characteristics 
in the funding rules. 
In Panels B and C, I present the two sets of the difference in differences estimates. For these 
estimates I divide the sample into three groups: schools that gained resources following the reform, 
schools that had fewer resources following the reform, and schools that had no change in resources.
 9
 
Note that dividing the sample according to the extent of change in school resources is appropriate since 
this variable is exogenous to potential outcomes of students (conditional on school fixed effects). It is 
also important to note that the schools that experienced no change in resources between the two periods 
serve as the comparison group and schools that experienced a change in resources in the second period 
                                                 
9
 Since there were few schools who experienced no change in resources, I expanded this category to include schools 
who experienced less than a +/- 2 percent change in resources. After this change, the mean percentage change in 
instructional hours per class for schools that experienced 'no change' was zero percent and the standard deviation 
was 1 percent. I also define schools that gained resources as schools that experienced a budget increase of more 
than 2 percent, and schools that lost resources as schools that experienced a budget decrease of more than 2 percent. 
Significantly, I found that the results are not sensitive to widening this range to -/+3 or narrowing it to -/+1 percent. 
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(either a gain or a loss) are the treatment group.
10
 Accordingly, in schools that gained resources, the mean 
percentage change in instructional hours per class is 8.4 percent and the standard deviation is 10.2 
percent. Furthermore, in schools that lost resources, the mean percentage change in instructional hours 
per class is -6 percent and the standard deviation is 4.2 percent.  
According to Table 2, the respective estimates from the two sets of difference in differences 
estimation are remarkably similar. The simple OLS estimate obtained from the ‘increase’ sample in 
Panel B is -0.013 while the respective estimate in Panel C for the ‘decrease’ sample is -0.017. Similarly, 
the estimated effects in column 4 are 0.005 in the ‘increase’ sample and 0.006 in the ‘decrease’ sample. 
This indicates that the estimates in Panels B and C are very similar to the respective estimates presented 
in Panel A, though these are much more precisely estimated. This similarity demonstrates not only that 
school resources have a positive effect on test scores, but that this effect is also fully symmetric in terms 
of an increase or a decrease in resources.  
It should be noted that the results of Table 2 estimate the effects of the reform only one or two 
years after its implementation. Therefore, a valid question is whether the changes we observe in schools 
and the estimates of the effect of school resources are representative of a longer run effect. Two pieces of 
evidence suggest that the estimates in Table 2 do reflect longer term adjustments. First, estimating the 
effect of school resources separately based on the contrast of 2002-2004 and 2003- 2005 yield almost 
exactly the same estimates, suggesting that the estimated effect based on experiencing one or two years 
of reform is the same. Second, the results of my alternative identification strategy which is based on 
cross section data analysis and reflects long term estimates (See Table 6) are identical to those presented 
in Table 2. 
Another possible concern is whether the results from Table 2 are biased due to the convergence 
of underachieving schools towards the level of high performing schools. In other words, if schools with a 
lower than average budget per class (who benefited more from the funding reform and presumably had 
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 A similar approach for difference in differences estimation is applied in Duflo (2001) where regions in Indonesia 
that experienced very low rate of school construction were defined as control areas while regions that had many 
new constructed schools were used as the treatment group. 
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lower average test scores in the pre-reform period) had a higher improvement rate of test scores due to a 
convergence effect, such convergence would be positively correlated with the resource gain from the 
funding reform and therefore will bias upward the estimated effect of the budget per class on test scores. 
To check the extent of this possible bias, I divided the sample into two groups based on budget per class 
in the pre-reform period and re-estimated equation (3) in each of these samples separately. The estimated 
effect of budget per class on the average test score obtained from the sample of schools with above 
average budget per student is 0.008 (se=0.006). The respective estimate obtained from the sample of 
schools with below mean budget per student is 0.006 (se=0.003). Stratifying the sample into four groups 
based on budget per student yields a similar pattern. This evidence suggests that it is very unlikely that 
the resource effect that we estimated reflects test score convergence. To examine this potential threat 
further, I replicated this estimation by stratifying the sample based on the average test score in the first 
period. The estimated effects from the first and third quartiles are identical (0.007, sd=0.004), and those 
obtained from the second and fourth quartiles are lower. Even though it is not correct statistically to 
stratify the sample based on an endogenous variable (school average test score), these estimates also 
suggest no difference in the estimated effect of budget per class in high- and low-achieving schools.
11
 In 
the next section, I estimate some particular channels through which school instructional resources affect 
student performance, in particular the length of the school week and classroom study time of core 
subjects.  
B. Identification and Estimation of Time on Task 
A school's instructional budget is largely spent on the length of the school week. Thus, I estimate 
equation (3) by replacing the instruction budget per class with the length of weekly school instruction (in 
terms of hours per week). The weekly instructional time is divided among different subjects. For this 
reason, I also estimate equation (3) where the sum of weekly hours of instruction of the three core 
subjects (math, science and English) is the treatment measure. One possible problem with this approach 
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 Results are available upon request. 
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is that these two measures of instructional time are choice variables and, therefore, could be endogenous 
in equation (3). If the choice made by schools of how much to allocate from the instructional budget to 
any of these two measures is a only a function of fixed characteristics of the school, then the school fixed 
effect model will identify the causal effect of any of these two treatment measures. However, if these 
choice decisions are correlated with the error term in equation (3), our results might be biased. I discuss 
this issue in greater detail in my Table 3 results.  
In the first row of Table 3, I estimate the effects of the length of the school week (number of 
weekly hours in school) on the average test score. The mean number of weekly hours in school is 35.0 
(sd=3.2). Similar to our Table 2 results, the OLS estimate is initially negative (-0.02) and statistically 
significant, and becomes positive (0.007) once schools fixed effects are added to the regression. In 
addition, the estimates in columns 2-4 are nearly identical, implying that adding the student and school 
characteristics as controls has no effect on the estimates and their standard errors. The estimated effect is 
0.008, and it is statistically significant (se=0.004).  
The estimated effect of the length of the school week and that of the budget per class can be 
compared based on the elasticity of the average test score. The elasticity of the instructional budget per 
class is 0.080, and the elasticity of the length of the school week is also 0.079.
12
 This implies that the 
instructional budget per class has an effect on test scores mainly through the increase in length of the 
school week. A validation of this result is also shown in the second row of Table 3, where I present 
estimates of the effect of the budget of weekly hours of instruction beyond the length of the school week 
(simply the difference between the instructional budget per class and the length of the school week) on 
the average test score. The mean of this measure is 11 weekly hours and its estimated effect presented in 
column 4 is 0.003 (sd=0.002). Its elasticity with respect to the average test scores is 0.01, confirming that 
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 These estimates are presented in Table A1 and they show exactly the same pattern that is shown in Tables 2 and 
3. Since the mean of the standardized test score is zero, I compute the two elasticities based on estimates of 
equation (3) where the dependent variable is the actual grade (scale 1 to 100) instead of the z score. The elasticity 
of the budget per class is computed as [0.127 x (46/70)] while the elasticity of the length of the school week is 
computed as [0.157 x (35/70)], both equal to 0.079.    
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the effect of class budget on average test scores of the three subjects, beyond what is allocated to the 
length of the school week, is indeed very small.  
 Another important implication of the similarity of these two estimated effects is with regard to 
the interpretation of the estimated effect of the length of the school week as causal. Given that the change 
in the instructional budget per class is exogenous, conditional on schools’ fixed effects, its estimated 
effect is clearly unbiased. Therefore, the similarity in the two point estimates and in their implied 
elasticities is suggestive evidence that the estimated effect of the length of the school week is unlikely to 
be biased due to selection or endogeneity. A related point is that if the effect of length of the school week 
were biased, upward or downward, then the effect of the difference between the instructional budget per 
class and the length of the school week should have been biased in the opposite direction. Instead, we 
find that this estimate is practically zero. 
In the third row of Table 3, I present estimates of the effect of the average weekly hours of 
instruction in math, science, and English. This average is equal to 4.6 hours per week (sd=1.70). The 
OLS estimate in column 1 is positive and significant. However adding the school fixed effects to the 
estimated equation almost double the estimated coefficients, from 0.029 to 0.055. Remarkably, however, 
the latter estimate remains unchanged as I add controls to the school fixed-effect regressions: the point 
estimate in the second column is 0.055 (sd=0.023) and is 0.053 (se=0.023) in columns 3 and 4.
 
This 
robust estimate implies that adding one hour of instruction in each of the three subjects raises the average 
score by 0.053 standard deviations.  
Remarkably, this result is very similar to the estimates that Dobbie and Fryer (2011) obtain from 
their sample of charter schools in New York City (NYC). They find that schools that add 25 percent or 
more instructional time have an annual gain that is 0.059 of a standard deviation higher in math. Note 
that a one hour increase in instruction time in our sample is approximately 25 percent (given that the 
respective mean is 4.6 hours) and our estimated effect is 0.053, almost identical to the NYC estimate. 
However, the authors emphasize that their estimates of the relationship between school inputs – 
including instructional time – and school effectiveness are unlikely to be causal given the lack of 
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experimental variation in school inputs. However, in a recent study of public schools in Houston, Texas 
Fryer (2012) reports similar size effects of instructional time: schools that add 25 percent or more 
instructional time compared to traditional public schools have annual gains that are 0.084 sd higher in 
math and 0.043 sd higher in English, and these results are based on controlled data. Moreover, the 
estimate of the effect of instructional time obtained from a sample of over 50 countries in Lavy (2010) is 
exactly equal to the estimate obtained in this paper and to the effect size presented in Dobbie and Fryer 
(2011). In the concluding section of the paper, I will discuss further this apparent ‘empirical regularity’ 
in the relationship between instructional time and test scores.    
 Furthermore, this estimate of 0.053 yields an elasticity of 0.21 which is almost identical to the 
elasticity of the length of the school week after we adjust for the difference in the means of the two 
instructional time measures.
13
 This result has two important implications. The first is that other time that 
children spend in school during the week in pursuits outside of math, science, and English classes, does 
not affect at all their achievement in these subjects. In other words, the effect of the length of the school 
week on average test scores is only a reflection of its correlation with the instructional time of these 
particular subjects. The implication is that whatever skills students acquire during the time in school 
spent outside of math, science, and English classes (60 percent of their total school time) are immaterial 
to their academic progress in these three core subjects, at least as reflected in the short-term math, 
science and English test scores. Perhaps we should not be surprised that knowledge in other subjects, 
such as history, geography and literature, is irrelevant for better achievement in math or science. 
However, students may acquire and enhance non-cognitive skills, such as socialization, confidence and 
determination, during longer school weeks. Thus, one might have expected potential spillover effects to 
surface for a wide array of academic pursuits.  
The similarity of the estimated effects of the length of the school week and of the instructional 
time in math, science and English has a second important implication: The effect of instructional time in 
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 The estimated effect of the average instruction time of these core subjects on the row test score is presented in 
the fourth row of appendix Table A1. The elasticity of this time measure is computed as [1.05 x (13.7/70)].    
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math, science and English is very unlikely to be biased. If the change in instructional time of these 
subjects between 2002/03 and 2004/05 were determined selectively with respect to potential outcomes in 
these subjects, we would have expected that the estimated effect of the length of the school week and of 
weekly hours of instruction of these subjects to be different. Instead, they are almost identical. A 
validation of this result is shown in the fourth row of Table 3, which presents estimates of the effect on 
the average test score of the number of weekly hours of instruction in all other subjects and activities in 
school. This measure of instructional time is simply the difference between the length of the school week 
and the instructional time of math, science and English, and its mean is 22 weekly hours. Remarkably, 
the point estimates in columns 2-4 are practically zero. This result confirms that there are no spillover 
effects in school in Israel from instruction of all other subjects on achievements in math, science and 
English. It also confirms that conditional on school fixed effects, the allocation of instructional time to 
math, science and English, given the length of the school week, is not correlated with potential outcomes 
in these subjects. Finally, if the estimated effect of instructional time of the core subject were biased, 
upward or downward, we should have expected that the effect of all other instructional time during the 
week to be biased. However, I do not observe such bias as the estimated effect of instruction on non-core 
subjects on average test scores for core subjects is nearly zero.    
 In Table 4, I rerun the results of Table 3 where the sample is stratified into schools who gained 
from the reform and schools who lost from the reform. Overall, the estimates from the two subsamples 
are very similar. For example, the estimated effect of the weekly instruction hours spent on the core 
subjects (presented in the third row of Table 4) is 0.073 in the ‘increase’ sample and 0.059 in the 
‘decrease’ sample. It is quite remarkable that increasing the teaching time of these subjects by one hour 
lead to a test score gain that is almost the same as the decline in test scores due to reducing instructional 
time of these subjects by one hour. I also view this similarity as another indication that these estimates 
are not biased since it is very unlikely that the selection in the reaction to a decline in resources will lead 
to a bias which will be the same as the bias induced by an endogenous reaction to an increase in 
resources.  
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C. Estimated effect of instructional time in each subject 
In this section, I specify and estimate a school fixed-effect model where both the dependent 
variable and the time of instruction per week are subject-specific, as follows: 
             Ykijt jρ Tkjtη Xijt  εS jt ukijt      (4) 
where Ykijt is the achievement in the k
th
 subject, in the j
th
 school, of the i
th
 student, and Tkjt is instructional 
time in the k
th
 subject in the j
th
 school. The unobserved error term ukijt is now subject’s specific. In 
addition, I estimate an alternative specification that also includes as treatments the hours of instruction in 
each of the other two subjects and the total instructional time of all other subjects:  
  Ykijt j ρ Tkjt  ηXijt εS j + λ T2jt θ T3jtσ Tojtukijt  (5) 
where T2jt and T3jt represent instructional time in the other two subjects and Tojt is instructional time in all 
other subjects. λ, θ, and σ are the cross subjects parameters. Note that the sum of Tk, T2, T3, and To‘ is 
equal to the length of the school week in terms of hours of instruction. By comparing the estimates 
obtained using equation (5) to those obtained based on using equation (3) and overall instructional time 
of the three subjects, I hope to strengthen the causal interpretation of the evidence.
14
  
In Table 5, I present the results of estimating equations (4) and (5) for each of the three subjects 
separately. Each parameter presented in the table is estimated in a separate regression. Each regression 
includes as controls school fixed effects, year dummies, student characteristics, and school 
characteristics. The three estimates presented in the first row are positive and precisely measured. The 
effect of an hour of instruction in math is 0.041 (sd=0.018), in science it is 0.043 (sd=0.016), and in 
English it is higher, 0.056 (sd=0.020). The average of these three estimates is 0.048, only slightly lower 
than the estimated average effect (0.053) reported in the third column of Table 2. Based on the close 
similarity of these two estimates, this implies that the distribution of the overall teaching time of all three 
subjects to each subject is not correlated with potential outcome. Overall, I conclude that the estimates 
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 I also compare the estimates of equation (4) to respective parameters based on a completely different 
identification methodology (See Table 6), and I will argue that the similarity in the estimates across methods 
strengthen their causal interpretation.  
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based on separate regression for each subject are fully consistent with the estimates obtained where the 
dependent variable is the average test scores of all three subjects and the treatment measure is the 
average instructional time in these subjects.   
In the second row, I present the results of estimating equation (5) where each regression includes 
all three subjects’ specific weekly hours of instruction as well as the sum of instructional time in all other 
subjects. The set of four estimates presented in each column is obtained from one regression. The table 
indicates that the estimates of the effect of instructional time of each subject on the same subject test 
score are very similar to the respective estimates reported in the first specification, though they are 
marginally higher for all three subjects. The biggest gap is in English, for which the estimate increases 
by 7 percent, from 0.056 to 0.063. The table also indicates that the cross effects results are all positive, 
though very small and not significantly different from zero. For example, the effects of math and science 
instructional time on English test scores are, not surprisingly, practically zero (0.007 and 0.001). The 
largest cross effect is that of math instructional time on science test score, 0.035. However, this effect is 
measured very imprecisely (sd=0.027) and therefore not statistically significant from zero. In 
comparison, the reciprocal cross effect of science instructional time on math is not important as this 
estimate is 0.011 (sd=0.013). Interestingly, the table also confirms our earlier finding that instructional 
time of non-core subjects (representing 60 percent of the length of the school week) has no effect on 
achievements in any of the three core subjects: the estimates in the fourth row of the second panel of 
Table 5 are all positive but very small, and they are not significantly different from zero. This result is 
also consistent with the evidence presented in Table 3. 
Overall, these findings strengthen our previous results, as I did not find any cross effects within 
subjects, and between each of these subjects and instructional time of non-core subjects. This can be 
viewed as additional suggestive evidence that the estimated effect of instructional time of each of the 
subjects is not biased due to selection or endogenous determination of these educational inputs (that is 
not accounted for by our natural experiment and our school fixed effect difference in differences 
framework).  
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D. An alternative identification strategy: between subjects variation in instructional time  
In this section, I present additional estimates to those presented above that are based on an 
alternative identification method that can account for potential confounding factors in the estimation of 
instructional time. Here I rely on within-student variations in instructional time across various subjects of 
study to examine whether differences in student performance in three subjects are systematically 
associated with differences between subjects in instructional time. The basic identification strategy is that 
student characteristics and the school environment are the same for all three subjects except for the fact 
that some subjects receive more instructional time. It important to emphasize that the pupil fixed-effect 
identification method proposed here does not exploit any variation in instructional time due to the 
funding reform. I use the cross-section variation since and observe students when they are exposed only 
to one regime of funding. Based on this approach I present within student estimates of the effect of 
instructional time on individual test scores using the following panel data specification, 
  Ykij iγ TkjXij S j j k) uijk     (6) 
Where Ykij is the achievement in the k
th
 subject of the i
th
 student in the j
th
 school, Tkj is instructional time 
in the k
th
 subject in the j
th
 school, X is a vector of characteristics of the i
th
 student in the j
th
 school and Sj is 
a vector of characteristics of the j
th
 school. jand k represents the unobserved characteristics of the 
school and the subject, respectively, and ukij is the remaining unobserved error term. The student fixed 
effect i captures the individual’s family background, underlying ability, motivation, and other constant 
non-cognitive skills. Of course, a specification that includes i will not include the term Xij. Note, that 
by controlling for this individual fixed effect and using within-student across subjects' variation in test 
scores, I also control for the school fixed effect j. Therefore, exploiting within-student variation allows 
one to control for a number of sources of potential biases related to unobserved characteristics of the 
school, the student, or their interaction. One potential source of bias is that students might be placed or 
be sorted according to their ability across schools that provide more (or less) instructional time in some 
subjects. For example, if more talented students attend better schools that provide more instructional 
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hours overall in each subject, it would cause γ to be biased downward unless the effect of student and 
school fixed effects are accounted for. Similarly, the bias will have an opposite sign if the less talented 
students are exposed to more instructional time. Identification of the effect of instructional time based on 
a comparison of the performance of the same student in different subjects is therefore immune to biases 
due to omitted school level characteristics, such as resources, peer composition and so on, or to omitted 
individual background characteristics, such as parental schooling and income. Equation (6) can be 
estimated with a single year’s cross-sectional data for each school, or it can be estimated using two years 
of data for each school, the latter allows including in the model a school fixed effect in addition to the 
pupil fixed effect. 
 This identification strategy is also subject to several key assumptions. First, a necessary 
assumption for this identification strategy is that the effect of instructional time is the same for all 
subjects, implying that γ cannot vary by subject. This restriction seems plausible as the first identification 
method that I used estimated the treatment effect for each subject separately and all three estimates were 
relatively similar. Second, the effect of instructional time is “net” of instructional time spillovers across 
subjects. This assumption is also supported by the evidence presented in Table 3 which showed that there 
are no significant cross-subject effects of hours of instruction. Third, this identification strategy does not 
preclude the possibility that pupils select or are sorted across schools partly based on subject-specific 
instructional time. For example, the results would be biased if students who have a high ability for math 
may select or be placed in a school that specializes in math and has more instructional time in math. 
However, I believe that this concern is not relevant for three reasons. First, the pupils in the sample are in 
fifth grade of primary school in Israel where admission is based on neighborhood school zones without 
any school choice. Second, primary schools that specialize in a given subject are very rare in Israel. 
Third, tracking within schools is not allowed in primary and middle schools in Israel, and Ministry 
circulars reiterate this issue frequently. Even if some schools overlook this regulation and practice 
tracking within school, this is not a major concern as I measure instructional time in each subject by the 
school-level means and not by the class means or even the within school program-level means. 
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Therefore, omitted subject-specific student ability will not be correlated with subject instructional time in 
a given school. 
 Table 6 presents the estimates based on the within pupil estimation strategy.
15
 Two different 
specifications are used. The regression results reported in the first column include year fixed effects, 
pupil demographic controls, and school characteristics. The regression reported in the second column 
includes also pupils fixed effects. In the first row I present estimates based on pooling all three subjects. 
The two estimates are positive and significantly different from zero. The estimate in the second column 
is lower than the estimate in the first column, suggesting that the OLS estimates are slightly upwardly 
biased. Significantly, the estimated effect when pooling the three subjects is 0.058 (sd=0.007), which is 
very similar to the estimated average effect of 0.053 reported in the third row of Table 3. This is a 
remarkable outcome since the two estimates are obtained from two very different identification 
strategies. As noted, in Table 3 the identifying assumption is to compare results within schools for two 
adjacent fifth-grade cohorts where nothing has changed except the funding rules, and, therefore the first 
difference estimation at the school level is appropriate. In Table 6, the identifying assumption is that 
conditional on pupil fixed effects, hours of instruction of each subject are not correlated with the 
potential outcome (the error term in equation (5)), and, therefore, estimation based on differences of all 
variables from pupil level means is accounting for all potential omitted variables. The similarity in the 
estimated average treatment effect of instructional time clearly contributes to the credibility of the 
interpretation of the estimates in Tables 2-4 as causal. This similarity also suggests that the short-term 
evidence presented in Table 3 is close to the estimated longer run effects presented in Table 6. 
In the other rows of Table 6, I present estimates based on pooling two of three subjects. This is 
possible since all that is needed for this identification strategy is at least two or more observations per 
student. Remarkably, all three estimates in column 2 are very similar and range from 0.055-0.060, 
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Since the treatment variable instructional time is measured at the school level the error term uijk, is clustered by 
school to capture common unobservable shocks to students at the same school.  
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providing additional proof that the effects of instructional time on each of these subjects are not very 
different. In addition, the average of the three separate effects is 0.058 which identical to the estimate in 
the first row that pools all three subjects. 
E. Heterogeneity in effect of instructional time 
 In this section, I consider the marginal productivity of instructional time in each of the three 
subjects. This is an important policy question as this parameter can be useful for allocating instructional 
resources across subjects and within schools. In Table 7, I report estimates from regressions where the 
continuous instructional time measure was converted to dummy indicators. Columns 1, 4, and 7 present 
the range of hours of instruction for each of the subjects. These ranges vary by subject. Math 
instructional time ranges from three to 10 hours a week, so it is measured by four such indicators as 
follows: five hours or less (mean=4.92), six hours, seven hours, eight hours or more (mean=8.20). 
Science instructional time ranges from one to seven hours a week, and, therefore, it is measured by four 
indicators as follows: two hours or less (mean=1.95), three hours, four hours, and five hours or more 
(mean=5.33). English instructional time ranges from two to eight hours a week, and it is also measured 
by four such indicators: three hours or less (mean=2.94 ), four hours, five hours, six hours or more 
(mean=6.12). Columns 2, 5, and 8 present the proportion of students in each range, which again varies by 
subject. For example, the lowest range in the three subjects includes similar proportions of students 
(from 15 percent in science and English to 19 percent in math). The highest range includes less than 5 
percent of the students in math and English but almost 18 percent of the students in science. 
The results reported in the Table 7 are based on a specification with student and school 
characteristics and year fixed effects. Columns 3, 6, and 9 are separate regressions where the treatments 
included in each regression are the respective subject indicators of hours of instruction. In column 3, a 
comparison of the marginal changes in productivity of an hour of math instruction suggests a moderate 
positive non-linearity: the gain from a sixth hour is 0.047, the seventh hour adds 0.080 and the eighth 
hour adds 0.090. The results are similar in columns 6 and 9 for science and English respectively. This 
suggests evidence of a slight increase in marginal productivity as hours of instruction increase.    
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In Table 8, I examine heterogeneity of the treatment results reported in Table 3. I present 
treatment effect estimates by gender, family education, and by the degree of heterogeneity in student 
ability in the classroom. Columns 1-2 of Table 8 show that the effect of additional instructional time for 
math is the same for boys and girls, but the effect of increasing science and English instructional time is 
much larger for boys.  
In columns 3-4, I present heterogeneous treatment effect by parental education. The sample is 
divided by the median value of the sum of one's father’s and mother’s years of schooling (a proxy for 
socioeconomic background). Interestingly, the effect of math instruction is much larger among children 
from families with low levels of parent education. The gap is more than 200 percent (0.055 versus 
0.023), suggesting that targeting of additional math instructional time to students from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds will yield much higher returns. The average gap between the groups is 
about half a standard deviation, so adding two to three hours of math instruction per week to the lower 
socioeconomic group should help narrow this gap. The effect of science hours of instruction is also 
higher for students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, but this gap is not very large. However, for 
English instruction, the results are reversed: the respective effect on English achievements is larger for 
the sample of students from families with high levels of education, though this difference is small.
16
  
  The productivity of school instruction may also vary by the heterogeneity in students’ ability in 
the classroom. Since parental schooling is highly correlated with student ability, I measured class level 
heterogeneity by the standard deviation of the classroom distribution of fathers’ schooling. In columns 5-
6 of Table 8, I present the effect of instructional time in each of the subjects for two sub-samples. The 
first, denoted as “heterogeneous,” includes classes where the standard deviation of the father’s level of 
schooling is above the median for the sample of classes. The second, denoted as “homogenous,” includes 
classes below the median. The productivity of instructional time is higher in homogenous classes in all 
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 Another interesting result is that the effect of math instruction on science achievement is much larger for students 
from backgrounds with low levels of parent education. Results are available upon request.    
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three subjects, with the largest difference being in math, but these differences are relatively small and not 
significantly different from zero.                                                                            
F. Effect of school instructional time on pupils’ homework effort and satisfaction in school   
 In order to fully assess the overall benefit of an extended school week program or of 
interventions that add instructional time to some subjects, it is important to consider other important 
questions. For instance, do students who “enjoy” a longer school week study harder at home and spend 
more time doing homework? Are they more satisfied in school? Are they better off socially in class? Do 
they feel more secured in school and get less involved in violence and bulling?  
In Table 9, I estimate the effects of classroom instructional time in each of the subjects on 
homework time allocation. For each subject I report results from three different regression specifications. 
In all three I include school fixed effects and student and school characteristics. In the first specification 
(columns 1, 4, and 7) the only treatment in the regression is the respective subject instructional time. In 
the second specification (columns 2, 5, and 8) I add the effects of the instructional time in each of the 
other two subjects. In the third specification (columns 3, 6, and 9) I also add the instructional time in all 
other subjects. Both before and after the reforms, students spent approximately 3.2 hours per week doing 
math homework, 2.5 hours doing science homework, and 3 hours doing English homework.  
The evidence presented in Table 9 suggests that homework time in each of the core subjects 
increases slightly with the subject’s increased instructional time in school. This effect is significant for 
math and English, but it is only marginally significant for science. In addition, the effect sizes are 
relatively small. For example, an increase of an hour of school instruction in math or English leads to an 
average increase of four to five minutes of homework. Considering that students are engaged in 
homework for 2 to 3 hours per subject, the changes in students’ time allocation in each of the three 
subjects are marginal. The table also indicates that these estimated effects are not sensitive to adding the 
measures of instructional time in other subjects. For example, when math instruction is the only included 
treatment, its effect on math homework time is 0.044 (sd=0.021), and it is unchanged when instructional 
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time of science and English are added to the regression. However, this estimate decreases to 0.041 when 
the regression includes instructional time for all other subjects.
17
  
These results imply that added school instructional time for any subject does not crowd out the 
time that students invest at home for the study of other subjects; to the contrary, it even marginally 
increases the overall time spent on homework. The implication is that an increase in instructional time at 
school leads to a net expansion of overall study time at home and at school together. Significantly, the 
additional time spent on homework is most likely a mechanism for the effect of increased school 
instructional time on test scores.   
An additional question linked to the school reforms concerns whether additional time spent in 
school would come at the expense of overall social and school satisfaction. Thus, it is important to assess 
and measure these effects for a more general equilibrium evaluation of the effect of extending the length 
of the school week. In Table 10, I present estimates of the effect of increased school instructional time 
per week on five behavioral outcomes: personal violence in school, mean level of classroom violence, 
personal fear of violence in school, satisfaction from school, and social satisfaction in school. The 
regression specification includes school fixed effects and student and school characteristics. Column 1 
reports estimates based on the full sample. In columns 2-3, I stratify the sample by gender. In columns 4-
5, I present the results for the high and low parental education samples, respectively, and in columns 6-7 
for the samples of homogenous and heterogeneous schools samples. The table indicates that there is no 
systematic pattern of an effect of the length of the school week on any of the five behavioral measures, 
and none of the five reported estimates in the first column is significantly different from zero.
18
 The 
                                                 
17
 I also estimate the effect of instructional time in each of the core subjects on the probability that some students 
receive additional instruction from privately funded tutors at home. Private tutors work with 14 percent of the 
students in math, 5 percent of students in science, and 27 percent of students in English. Additional school 
instructional time in math and science has positive effect on the propensity of getting private tutoring but these 
effects are small and insignificant for all three subjects. The estimate for math instructional time is 0.003 
(se=0.003), for science 0.002 (se=0.001) and for English precisely zero. Results are available upon request. 
18
 It should be noted that there are some results that are significant such as the negative estimated effect for boys on 
school satisfaction. In addition, three other statistically significant parameter estimates in Table 10 are: the negative 
effect of the length of the school week on classroom violence in heterogeneous school, the positive effect on 
28 
 
conclusion, therefore, is that extending the school week carries no negative repercussions in terms of 
satisfaction of students from school, the class social environment, or levels of school violence. 
  
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper, I estimate empirically the effect of school resources and various measures of 
increased instructional time in school on students’ academic performance and behavior. In particular, I 
analyze the effects of the instructional budget per class, the length of the school week, and the 
instructional time of math, science and English on test scores in these subjects and on homework time of 
students. I also assess students’ school satisfaction, social acclimatization, violence, and fear of bullying. 
I take advantage of a policy reform in Israel that began in 2004 which changed the rules of funding 
public primary schools. The system changed from funding based on number of classes to a system based 
on number of students, weighted to take into account their average socioeconomic status. The results 
based on fifth-grade students’ test scores clearly indicate that school resources and the length of the 
school week have a positive and significant effect on pupils’ performance in core subjects. Importantly, 
the effects of increasing or decreasing school resources or the length of the school week are fully 
symmetric, as they are identical in absolute terms though opposite in sign. The evidence also consistently 
shows that increasing the amount of instructional time of math, science, or English positively impacts 
test scores in that subject. Here as well, the effect of increasing or decreasing instructional time in the 
core subjects is symmetric. An alternative identification strategy based on a pupil fixed-effect estimation 
that exploits variation of time of instruction in different subjects yields exactly the same results. The 
evidence also strongly suggests that increased achievement in a given subject is the result of increased 
time on that particular arena of study alone. Results show that cross effects – the benefits of additional 
instructional time in one subject upon the achievements in another – are negligible. There is no spillover 
                                                                                                                                                            
personal violence in homogenous schools, and the negative effect on school satisfaction in homogenous schools. 
These however are very small effects and therefore not economically meaningful. 
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effect on math and English from increased instructional time in other subjects, and only modest increases 
in science, with the slight benefit stemming from increased math instructional time. In addition, there are 
no apparent cross effects from instructional time spent engaging in all other subjects such as history, 
geography, literature, and social studies on math, science and English test scores. The evidence also 
suggests some heterogeneity in the effect of instructional time. For example, increased instructional time 
in science and English leads to more dramatic academic achievement growth for boys, while additional 
math instructional time results in more pronounced academic achievement growth for girls. Pupils from 
families with low levels of parent education show higher gains in achievement from additional classroom 
instruction in math and science. Increasing instructional time in math, science or English actually leads 
to an increase in the time at home that students spend on homework. Finally, the evidence suggests that 
expanding the school week does not diminish the school and social satisfaction of students. 
This is the first paper that provides such detailed evidence on the causal effects of the school 
instructional resources, the length of the school week, and of instructional time in different subjects on 
students’ academic performance and on important behavioral outcomes. The results are based on a 
sample that includes all the primary schools in Israel (with the exception of Arab and religious Orthodox 
Jewish schools). In this sample the means of the length of the school week and the time of instruction in 
math, science and English in Israel are very similar to the respective means of the OECD countries as 
observed in the PISA data from its various rounds in the previous decade. These two aspects provide an 
external validity appeal to the evidence presented here because they are relevant to many countries that 
seek ways to improve their education system. The evidence presented in the paper can also serve as a 
good benchmark for evaluating the effect and the cost-benefit of many “traditional” school interventions 
such as reducing class size, increasing teachers’ training, and tracking student by ability. As well, it can 
also serve as a benchmark for evaluating more recent popular “progressive” interventions in schools such 
as pay for performance for teachers or for students, or using computer added instructions in the 
classroom.   
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A. Instruction time
46.63 45.69
(5.99) (5.86)
35.06 34.76
(3.21) (3.14)
13.68 13.88
(1.67) (1.72)
Weekly instruction hours in:
6.00 6.12
(0.79) (0.81)
3.60 3.60
(1.09) (1.05)
4.07 4.15
(0.69) (0.70)
B. Test scores
70.93 75.14
(15.42) (14.47)
72.34 71.97
(19.16) (16.96)
65.74 77.14
(17.79) (15.86)
73.23 75.00
(20.73) (21.58)
Instruction budget per class               (in 
weekly hours) 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Instruction Time, Test Scores, and School 
Characteristics
Years
2002-2003 2004-2005
Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The sample includes all
the Jewish secular and religious state schools. This sample includes over 60 percent
of the schools and students in the country. 
Length of the school week                  (in 
weekly hours) 
Weekly instruction hours of math, 
science, and English 
Math 
Science 
English
Average test scores (math, science, and 
English) 
Math 
Science 
English
C. School Characteristics
441.65 440.78
(154.07) (154.53)
28.11 27.96
(4.10) (4.04)
0.22 0.22
(0.41) (0.41)
Number of schools 920 927
Number of students 53,981 55,633
Class size
Religious school
Enrollment
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Instruction Time, Test Scores, Schools 
Characteristics
Years
2002-2003 2004-2005
Year Control 
Only
School Fixed 
Effect
School Fixed 
Effect and 
Student 
Characteristics
School Fixed 
Effect, Student, 
and School 
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
-0.015 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of Schools 932 932 932 932
Number of Students 88,495 88,495 87,903 87,903
Panel B: 
-0.013 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of Schools 447 447 447 447
Number of Students 42,331 42,331 42,033 42,033
Panel C: 
-0.017 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of Schools 673 673 673 673
Number of Students 64,652 64,652 64,269 64,269
Notes: Standard errors are  presented in parentheses and are clustered at the school level. Each parameter presented in columns (1)-
(4) is from a different regression. All specifications include year fixed effects. Student characteristics include: gender dummy, both 
parents' years of schooling, number of siblings, immigration status indicators, and ethnic origin indicators. School characteristics 
include: student enrollment and student enrollment squared.
Table 2: Estimated  Effect of School Instruction Budget per Class on the Average Score in Math, Science, and English 
Full Sample
"Increase" Sample
"Decrease" Sample
The Controls Included in the Regression 
Measures of Instruction Time
Year Control 
Only
School Fixed 
Effect
School Fixed 
Effect and 
Student 
Characteristics
School Fixed 
Effect, Student 
and School 
Characteristics
Subject All Subjects All Subjects All Subjects All Subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.020 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.012 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.029 0.055 0.053 0.053
(0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
-0.023 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of Schools 932 932 932 932
Number of Students 88,495 88,495 87,903 87,903
Difference between instruction budget 
per class and length of school week
The Controls Included in the Regression 
Average weekly instruction hours of 
math, science and English 
Table 3: Estimated  Effect of School Instruction Time on the Average Score in Math, Science, and English
Notes: See Table 2.
Length of the school week (in weekly 
hours) 
Weekly instruction hours of all other 
subjects
School Fixed 
Effect
School Fixed 
Effect and 
Student 
Characteristics
School Fixed 
Effect, Student 
and School 
Characteristics
School Fixed 
Effect
School Fixed 
Effect and 
Student 
Characteristics
School Fixed 
Effect, Student 
and School 
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.076 0.073 0.073 0.060 0.059 0.059
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Number of Schools 447 447 447 673 673 673
Number of Students 42,331 42,331 42,033 64,652 64,652 64,269
Notes: See Table 2.
Table 4: Estimated  Effect of School Instruction Time on the Average Score in Math, Science, and English 
Length of the school week (in weekly 
hours) 
Difference between instruction budget 
per class and length of school week
Average weekly instruction hours of 
math, science and English 
"Increase" Sample "Decrease Sample"
The Controls Included in the Regression 
Math Science English
(1) (2) (3)
Specification I:                                               
Only own subject's hours of instruction is  
included as treatment 0.041 0.043 0.056
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020)
Specification II:                                               
All three subjects' hours of instruction and 
total of other subjects' hours of instruction are 
included as treatments
0.043 0.035 0.007
(0.019) (0.027) (0.023)
0.011 0.046 0.001
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
0.017 0.009 0.063
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
0.003 0.005 0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Number of Schools 932 932 932
Number of Students 100,834 99,842 99,395
Science instruction hours
English instruction hours
Other subjects total weekly  instruction hours
Note: See Table 2. In Specification II, the set of four estimates presented in each column is obtained from one
regression. 
Table 5: Estimated Effect of School Instruction Time by Subject on Test Score
Test Score
Math instruction hours
Subject Combination
(1) (2)
0.069 0.058
(0.007) (0.007)
0.074 0.055
(0.007) (0.010)
0.080 0.060
(0.011) (0.016)
0.056 0.059
(0.008) (0.012)
Number of schools 933 933
Number of students 166,630 167,726
Science + English
Notes: See Table 2. These regressions assume that the effect of instruction time is
the same for all subjects.
Table 6: Estimated  Effect of School  Instruction Time on Test Score Based 
on Within Pupil Regressions
OLS Regression 
with Pupil and 
School 
Characteristics
Regression with 
Pupil Fixed Effects
Math + Science + English
Math + Science 
Math + English
Grouping Hours
Proportion 
in Sample Estimate Grouping Hours
Proportion 
in Sample Estimate Grouping Hours
Proportion 
in Sample Estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
5 hours or less 2 hours or less 3 hours or less
(mean=4.92) (mean=1.95) (mean=2.94)
0.047 -0.001 0.068
(0.027) (0.037) (0.035)
0.080 0.066 0.079
(0.041) (0.042) (0.045)
8 hours or more 0.090 5 hours or more 0.105 6 hours or more 0.130
(mean=8.20) (0.064) (mean=5.33) (0.055) (mean=6.12) (0.071)
5.45% 17.57% 3.50%
Note: See Table 2. All specifications include year fixed effects, student and school characteristics.
7 hours 15.78% 4 hours 35.80% 5 hours 19.73%
-
6 hours 59.70% 3 hours 31.62% 4 hours 62.25%
Table 7: Estimated Non-Linear Effect of School Instruction Time by Subject on Test Score
Test Scores
Math Science English
19.07% - 15.01% - 14.52%
Boys Girls
High 
Education
Low 
Education
Heterogeneous 
Schools
Homogenous 
Schools 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.042 0.046 0.023 0.055 0.034 0.049
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028)
0.054 0.030 0.037 0.046 0.035 0.046
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.033) (0.022)
0.069 0.042 0.063 0.049 0.035 0.044
(0.022) (0.025) (0.019) (0.026) (0.029) (0.039)
Number of schools 910 913 927 932 608 596
Number of students 50,273 50,561 46,932 53,911 50,325 50,509
Note: See Table 2. All specifications include year fixed effects, student and school characteristics.
English instruction hours
Table 8: Heterogeneity in Estimated Effect of School Instruction Time by Subject on Test Score: by Gender, Family Education and 
School Homogeneity
Gender Family Education School Homogenity
Math instruction hours
Science instruction hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.044 0.044 0.041 - 0.003 0.005 - 0.016 0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
- -0.009 -0.012 0.021 0.022 0.024 - -0.005 -0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
- -0.005 -0.008 - -0.002 0.000 0.048 0.048 0.044
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
- - -0.005 - - 0.004 - - -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Number of schools
Number of students 97,174 97,057 97,042
Note: See Table 2. All specifications include year fixed effects, student and school characteristics.
Math instruction hours
Science instruction hours
English instruction hours
Other subjects total weekly  instruction 
hours
932 932 932
Table 9: Estimated Effect of School Instruction Time by Subject on Homework Hours
Homework Hours
Math Science English
(mean=3.19, sd=1.55) (mean=2.48, sd=1.55) (mean=3.00, sd=1.60)
Full Sample Boys Girls High Education Low Education
Hetrogenous 
Schools
Homogenous 
Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Personal Violence 0.000 -0.007 0.006 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.011
(mean=1.97, sd=1.43) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Class Violence -0.006 -0.009 -0.005 0.002 -0.009 -0.029 0.001
(mean=3.62, sd=1.54) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010)
Fear from Violence at School -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(mean=2.02, sd=1.55) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
School Satisfaction -0.005 -0.015 0.004 -0.005 -0.006 0.003 -0.017
(mean=5.18, sd=1.25) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Social Satisfaction 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.007
(mean=5.16, sd=1.24) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of schools 932 910 913 928 932 609 598
Number of students 97,664 48,323 48,812 45,321 51,814 48,290 48,845
Table 10: Estimated  Effect of Length of School Week on Violence and Student Satisfaction.
Sample
Gender Family's Education School Homogenity
Notes: See table 2. All specifications include year fixed effects, student and school characteristics. Each parameter presented in the table is from a different regression. Violence and the student
satisfaction raw variables range between 1 (lowest) to  6 (highest). The estimates in columns (1)-(3) are based on these variables' z scores.
Measures of Instruction Time
Year Control 
Only
School Fixed 
Effect
School Fixed 
Effect and 
Student's 
Characteristic
Subject All Subjects All Subjects All Subjects All Subjects Math Science English
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.269 0.119 0.119 0.127 0.070 0.129 0.182
(0.030) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.064) (0.061) (0.080)
-0.378 0.135 0.156 0.157 0.142 0.142 0.187
(0.055) (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) (0.117) (0.109) (0.142)
-0.218 0.060 0.055 0.060 0.019 0.065 0.096
(0.034) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.058) (0.050) (0.072)
0.538 1.083 1.055 1.050 0.990 1.552 0.608
(0.324) (0.431) (0.429) (0.430) (0.475) (0.711) (0.611)
-0.441 -0.045 -0.021 -0.019 -0.024 -0.110 0.075
(0.055) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.112) (0.118) (0.142)
Number of schools 932 932 932 932 932 932 932
Number of students 88,495 88,495 87,903 87,903 87,903 87,903 87,903
Average weekly instruction hours of 
math, science and English 
Weekly hours instruction of all other 
subjects
Notes: Standard errors are  presented in parentheses and are clustered at the school level. Each parameter presented in columns (1)-(7) is from a different regression. All specifications include year fixed effects. Student 
characteristics include: gender dummy, both parents' years of schooling, number of siblings, immigration status indicators and ethnic origin indicators. School characteristics include: enrollment and enrollment square.
Table A1: Estimated  Effect of School Instruction Time on the Average Score in Math, Sciences and English (non-standartized scores)
The Controls Included in the Regression 
School Fixed Effect, Student's and school's Characteristics
Instruction budget per class (in weekly 
hours) 
Length of the school week (in weekly 
hours) 
Difference between instruction budget 
per class and length of school week
